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Could Education Promote the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process?
* 
 
This paper explores Palestinians’ attitudes towards a peace process and their determinants, 
with a particular focus on the role of education. Understanding the factors that shape 
attitudes towards peace is important in order to be successful in negotiations or in 
implementing a peace agreement. In the literature, there is particular disagreement about the 
role of education. While some authors have linked violent and extreme positions to ignorance 
and to low market opportunities, others have found that education is positively correlated with 
being a member of a terrorist group. To better understand the role of education I decompose 
the attitudes towards peace into two dimensions; attitudes towards reconciliation and 
attitudes towards concessions. To measure these attitudes, I use a flexible item response 
model proposed by Spady (2007), which allows to take into account the multidimensionality 
of the concepts. The results show that education has a positive effect on attitudes towards 
concessions but a negative effect on attitudes towards reconciliation. This may occur 
because relative to a situation of peace, highly educated individuals are more strongly 
affected by current depressed economic conditions in Palestine. They therefore have more to 
gain from a peace agreement and may thus be more willing to make concessions. At the 
same time, they may be more frustrated and therefore less willing to reconcile. I also find that 
their attitudes to reconciliation move closely with aggregate economic conditions, while those 
of less educated individual are also influenced by local factors such as the construction of the 
separation barrier in their region of residence.  
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with the maps. 1 Introduction
The Arab-Israeli conﬂict has been considered one of the most complex and emotion-laden his-
torical problems of the twentieth century. This dispute between the State of Israel and the
Palestinians living under Israeli occupation has played a critical role not only in Middle East
politics, but also at the world level (see Freedman (1979)).
Repeatedly, a two state solution has been proposed, consisting in an independent Palestinian
state next to the state of Israel. Several eﬀorts at negotiating such a solution have taken place
and failed. According to many polls, large majorities of Israelis and Palestinians would also favor
a two state solution.1 Despite this basic agreement, there are signiﬁcant areas of disagreement
about what constitutes an acceptable solution. First, not all Palestinians and Israelis agree on
the concessions they are willing to make in order to reach a peace agreement. Second, there is
a problem of credibility; even if a peace agreement is reached, reconciliation between the two
societies does not seem easy and therefore each side fears that the other might not keep the
basic commitments. As a consequence, the conﬂict has been going on for many years and the
level of violence has been increasing.
The goal of this paper is to analyze Palestinians’ attitudes towards a peace process, with
a particular focus on how these attitudes vary with personal and demographic characteristics.
Attitudes matter. As Jaeger, Klor, Miaari and Paserman (2008) write, “These conﬂicts, [like
the Israeli-Palestinian one,] in which a limited number of fatalities are used to aﬀect negotia-
tions, demoralize the civilian population, or strategically incapacitate the opponent, are largely
psychological.” Within Palestinian society, there are a variety of views and opinions. Under-
standing the factors that shape the attitudes of individual Palestinians is important because it
can help to identify some important elements for a successful peace process. Recently, there
have been some attempts to study the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict from this point of view; e.g.
Nachtwey and Tessler (2002), Jasso and Meyersson (2004), Friedman (2005) and Jaeger et al.
(2008).
While exploring the determinants of Palestinians’ attitudes to the conﬂict more generally,
1See results from surveys conducted by the Palestinian Survey Research for the Palestinians and Harry S.
Truman Centre for the Israelis.
2this paper focusses in particular on the role played by education. Often, violent and extreme
positions are attributed to ignorance and to low market opportunities. Berman and Laitin (2005)
for instance use a ‘club good’ model to explain the function of voluntary religious organizations
as providers of terrorism, where terrorism is seen as a local public good. A possible interpretation
of this model is that poverty breeds terrorism as it lowers the outside options of club members.
This link can also be found in the work by Bueno de Mesquita (2005), Bueno de Mesquita
and Dickson (2007) and Jaeger et al. (2008). In contrast to this, Abadie (2006), Krueger and
Maleckova (2003) and Berrebi (2007) ﬁnd that suicide attackers and participants in violent
groups tend to have higher education and living standards above the poverty line. Similarly,
using a unique data set detailing the biographies of Palestinian suicide bombers, Benmelech and
Berrebi (2007) estimate the returns to human capital in suicide bombing and ﬁnd that older
and more educated suicide bombers are assigned to more important targets and perform better
(more casualties and lower probability of failure).
Because the relation between education and political violence is disputed, it is important
to analyze its role for attitudes towards a peace process. In this, it is important to clearly
distinguish income from education, and personal or family income from GDP per capita or
the overall economic situation. While education may drive expected or potential income, this
can be quite diﬀerent from actual income. Indeed, given the currently very depressed returns
to education Palestine (shown in Section 2.1), education conditional on current income is more
likely a measure of an individual’s current economic losses from the conﬂict. Therefore, education
and income should not be expected to have similar eﬀects.
For instance, as argued in Section 3, if the earnings of educated individuals are more de-
pressed relative to a situation of peace, then they may be more willing to make concessions to
reach a peace agreement. At the same time, they may be more frustrated due to past losses and
therefore less willing to reconcile. In contrast, it is not clear how current income conditional on
education would evolve with a peace agreement; individuals may well all have similar expecta-
tions. Similarly, a change in the overall economic situation may aﬀect attitudes diﬀerently from
a change of an individual’s situation relative to other Palestinians. One important contribution
of the paper is to pay careful attention to these issues.
3The other main contribution of the paper lies in the measurement of the attitudes. I deﬁne
attitudes towards a peace process as consisting of two components: attitudes towards ‘chances
for reconciliation and lasting peace in a scenario of successful negotiations’ and attitudes ‘on po-
sitions expressed and concessions discussed in the negotiations.’ I develop a new measure of such
attitudes, arguing that opinions of individuals about certain aspects of conﬂict resolution reﬂect
their attitudes in these dimensions. Applying a new methodology by Spady (2007), I measure
attitudes towards reconciliation and towards concessions as latent attitudes at the individual
level. The data used is a series of item responses concerning attitudes towards reconciliation and
towards concessions from some of the surveys realized by the Palestinian Center for Policy and
Survey Research (PSR). This data is particularly useful because questions are very precise and
allow distinguishing between attitudes towards reconciliation and towards concessions. I have
information about attitudes towards reconciliation for the period 2001-2006 and about attitudes
towards concessions for 2003-2006. Assuming that respondents’ answers have been determined
by their attitudes in these dimensions, the attitudes of individuals making up the sample pop-
ulation can then be given probability distributions, based on their item responses and personal
characteristics. From these probability distributions I can infer the relation between individuals’
economic and demographic characteristics and their attitudes.
The measure I propose allows for the multidimensionality of attitudes to peace (involving
attitudes both towards reconciliation and towards concessions) and takes into account various
facets of each of the dimensions. It thus goes beyond the use of a single, speciﬁc question,
capturing only a single aspect of a particular dimension, as often seen in the literature (e.g.
Jaeger et al. (2008)). This is important because a measure of a broad concept such as attitudes
towards a peace process arguably improves if it can span several dimensions. In our analysis we
use six items (questions) for the reconciliation scale and six for the concessions scale. Each of
the items can be seen as reﬂecting a diﬀerent dimension of the concept.
The results of the paper indicate that I) There are theoretical reasons for considering atti-
tudes towards peace as composed of two distinct dimensions; attitudes towards reconciliation
and attitudes towards concessions. This multidimensional construct provides new meaningful
insights about the role of education. II) Education is positively related to attitudes towards
4concessions. III) In contrast to the results on concessions, education has a negative eﬀect on
attitudes towards reconciliation. This negative eﬀect has been strengthening over the years in
the sample (2001-2006). IV) What possibly drives the negative eﬀect of education on attitudes
towards reconciliation is a higher level of frustration for more educated individuals due to the
low labor market opportunities. V) Attitudes towards reconciliation of individuals with high
education closely follow the evolution of the overall economic situation. VI) Speciﬁc regional
factors (construction of the Wall) inﬂuence attitudes towards reconciliation for individuals with
low education only.
These ﬁndings also show that allowing for attitudes to peace to have more than one dimension
is important for understanding the problems faced, as shown in particular by the diﬀerent eﬀect
of education in diﬀerent dimensions. Willingness to make concessions is a necessary condition
to establish peace in a ﬁrst stage. Reconciliation is also very important. Several authors (e.g.
Kulle and Hamber (2000)) have emphasized that a lack of forgiveness may threaten the peace
peace processes in the long run. Bar-Tal (2000) notices that there is not so much attention to
the attitudes towards reconciliation. Reconciliation based on mutual trust and acceptance. In
this paper we try to capture these several dimensions, for that, Spady’s (2007) estimator has
proven very useful.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 revises brieﬂy the previous evidence
on the relationship between individuals’ attitudes and the conﬂict. Section 3 presents a simple
theoretical argument for treating attitudes towards peace as a composite of two dimensions.
This argument will also guide the estimation. In Section 4 I describe the methodology used
to obtain the measure of the attitudes. In Section 5 I present the data used, and I describe
the questionnaire items and the personal and demographic characteristics of the respondents
that play a role in the estimation of the latent attitudes. In Section 6 I obtain the measure
of attitudes towards concessions and towards reconciliation and analyze their determinants and
their correlation with economic trends. I also investigate the channel through which the events
of the conﬂict can shape attitudes. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
52 Previous evidence on the relationship between individuals’
attitudes and the conﬂict
The Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict has generated a considerable amount of social research. Most of
this research implicitly assumes that the conﬂict shapes individuals’ attitudes, and that these
attitudes have an eﬀect on individuals’ behavior. Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) for instance argue
that in the presence of terrorist activity, individuals value the future less relative to the present.
They show that these changes in individuals’ preferences inﬂuence macroeconomic aggregates.
Concretely, they lead to lower investment and lower income and consumption in the long run.
Zussman and Zussman (2006) evaluate the net eﬀect of the Israeli counterterrorism policy on
attitudes and on the economy. They argue that assassinating members of Palestinian terrorist
organizations can be counterproductive if it increases Palestinians’ motivation for future attacks.
Their idea is that it is possible to ﬁnd moral objections to this type of policy, and these moral
objections can aﬀect Palestinians’ attitudes and therefore increase retaliation. To evaluate the
eﬀect of this policy, they exploit the forward-looking and information-aggregating nature of asset
markets. Using reactions of the Israeli stock market to news of counterterrorism operations,
they ﬁnd that assassinations of low-ranked members of Palestinian terrorist organizations are
perceived as counterproductive. The opposite is true for assassinations of senior leaders.
Berrebi and Klor (2006, 2007) argue that terror attacks aﬀect Israeli public opinion, which
in turn has an eﬀect on election outcomes. To study the relation between Palestinian militant
groups and the Israeli political system they present a theoretical model where Palestinians
commit terror attacks and Israelis elect governments. The model predicts that support for
Israel’s right-wing party increases after periods of severe terrorism, and that the expected level
of terrorism is higher when a left-wing party is in power. They show empirical evidence that
supports these results.
The work of Jaeger and Paserman (2006, 2007) focuses on trying to explain the dynamics
of the violence. They ﬁnd that Israel reacts in a predictable way to Palestinian attacks, while
Palestinian actions do not appear to be related to Israeli violence. Their conclusion is that a
cessation of Palestine violence against Israel may lead to an overall reduction in the level of vio-
lence. This result suggests that it is essential to understand the factors that shape Palestinians’
6attitudes towards peace and towards the resolution of the conﬂict.
However, Palestinians’ attitudes have not been studied very much. Nachtwey and Tessler
(2002) notice that “Only a small portion of this research [on the Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict] has
explored the determinants of popular attitudes towards the conﬂict, however, the factors that
shape Palestinian public opinion have been particularly neglected.” They study the degree to
which economic expectations change individuals’ attitudes towards peace. Recently there have
been some other attempts to study the conﬂict from this point of view. Jasso and Meyersson
(2004) study the eﬀects of identity and social distance on support for key provisions of the
Roadmap, and Friedman (2005) studies the determinants of Palestinians’ attitudes towards
diplomacy and attacks. Similar to Nachtwey and Tessler (2002) they ﬁnd that the economic
impact of future peace exerts a positive eﬀect but that individuals’ current economic situation
plays only a modest role. Jaeger et al. (2008) study how violence in the Second Intifada inﬂuences
public opinion. They ﬁnd evidence that Israeli violence against Palestinians temporary leads to
more support for radical factions and to more radical attitudes towards the conﬂict.
An area where important advances are possible is the measurement of individuals’ attitudes.
Clearly, concepts like attitudes towards peace, towards reconciliation or towards violence are
inherently diﬃcult to measure. Using only one question (e.g. ‘what party do you support?’
or ‘Do you think that lasting peace with Israel is possible?’) is restrictive. It is diﬃcult to
believe that these partial measures are suﬃcient for capturing wider concepts like attitudes
towards peace. The approach I use overcomes these limitations by incorporating more than one
dimension of the attitudes towards peace, and by measuring each dimension using responses to
more than one question.
Contentwise, an important question that this paper tackles concerns the link between atti-
tudes and education. This issue is intimately linked to some important features of the Palestinian
labor market.
2.1 Labor market and returns to schooling
The Palestinian economy is characterized by a labor market that is completely dependent on the
Israeli market, and strongly inﬂuenced by political and social events. Palestinian unemployment
and domestic wage respond to job opportunities and wages in Israel. Angrist (1995) analyzes
7the Palestinian labor market over the period 1981-1987 and ﬁnds that over that period, the
unemployment rate of college graduates increased strongly, while returns to education declined
substantially. The college premium fell from was 40% at the beginning of the period to 20%
between 1984 and 1987. Angrist (1995) shows that changes in labor supply explain an impor-
tant part of this development. The number of Palestinian college graduates increased sharply
following the opening of Palestinian institutions of higher education, which had been totally
absent before 1972.
Sayre (2001a) studies the same period and stresses some demand factors that also explain
part of the dramatic changes in returns to schooling. He argues that the reduction of demand
for skilled Palestinian workers by the Arab Gulf countries, the increase in demand for unskilled
Palestinian workers in Israel and changes in labor demand coming from changes in the volume
of international trade can explain part of the changes observed during this period. Using a
slightly diﬀerent empirical approach, Sayre (2001b) ﬁnds that while supply changes could still
account for most of the decrease in returns to schooling, demand shocks could explain as much
as one-third of the change in the returns to a college. For similar reasons, the return to college
remained low in the period 1995-2001 (Sayre and Miller 2004). Unemployment and wages in the
Palestinian Territories continue to depend on the Israeli economy and are driven by closures,
job permits, changes in the demand of low skilled workers, etc.
Angrist (1995) and Sayre (2001a) also link the bad labor market prospects for educated
Palestinians from 1981 to 1988 to the uprising of the ﬁrst Intifada. Sayre and Miller (2004) link
the similar situation experienced by the Palestinian economy during 1995-2001 to the uprising
of the second Intifada.
Although recently some papers have analyzed the eﬀects of conﬂict and in particular border
closures with Israel on the Palestinian economy and in particular the labor market (see Bulmer
(2003), Miaari and Sauer (2006) or Maio and Nando) none of these studies report returns to
schooling for the period under analysis in this paper (2001-2006). But economic conditions
have worsened since 2000. Despite other factors that may aﬀect the Palestinian economy, the
World Bank (2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008) repeatedly reported that the closures and restrictions
on movements related to Israeli security concern have harmed the Palestinian economy and
8increased unemployment and poverty. Figure 1 shows rough estimates of the college premium
in the Palestinian territories for the period under analysis. This ﬁgure shows that the college
premium during this period has gone from 16% to 30%. This is much lower than the college
premium in the U.S., which is around 60% in this period (Goldin and Katz 2007).
This literature suggests that the depressed opportunities faced by highly educated Palestini-
ans could shape their attitudes towards the peace process. The next section sets out a simple
model showing which relationships we could expect.
3 Education and willingness to make concessions and to recon-
cile
Suppose that Palestinians value consumption and derive value from their relationships with
Israelis. These valuations govern their attitudes towards making concessions and towards recon-
ciliation. Assume that the peace process has two stages. In a ﬁrst stage, Palestinians and Israelis
have to reach an oﬃcial settlement or resolution and stop direct violence. Success depends on a
negotiation process and on individuals’ attitudes towards concessions on both sides. The second
stage of the peace process consists in a normalization of the relationship between Palestinians
and Israelis. This stage involves reconciliation and psycho/social healing. (these stages are also
described in Gawerc (2006)).
Suppose that in the ﬁrst stage of the conﬂict, Palestinians have the choice of how many
concessions to make. Denote the choice of concessions by s ∈ R+
0 . Making concessions may
lead to a peace agreement with Israel, with the probability p of an agreement increasing in
the amount of concessions made. However, the “marginal product” of concessions in increasing
the probability of an agreement is decreasing and goes to zero in the limit (p0 > 0, p00 < 0,
0 ≤ p(0) < 1, lims→∞ p(s) ≤ 1). As a consequence, there is no ﬁnite amount of concessions that
leads to an agreement with probability 1.
Individual Palestinians expect income of w(e) after a peace agreement, which increases with
the individual’s education e. They currently earn ¯ w. Reﬂecting the evidence discussed above,
current income and returns to education are both depressed ( ¯ w < w(e), ¯ w0(e) = 0 for all e). For
simplicity, current returns to education are set to zero.
9Whereas making concessions could raise future incomes, it also has a psychological (and
possibly also a real) cost ci per unit of concessions. This diﬀers across individuals. It may
depend on demographics, but also vary in unobserved ways. While in principle, the cost could
vary systematically with education, we abstract from this. Individuals then choose their optimal
level of concessions by choosing s to maximize the objective function p(s)w(e)+(1−p(s)) ¯ w−cis.2
The optimal s is the theoretical counterpart to the willingness to concede we measure in the
data. The optimal amount of concessions, if interior, then satisﬁes p0(s)[w(e)− ¯ w] = ci. Because
p0 > 0, p00 < 0, w0 > 0 and w(e) > ¯ w, the optimal s increases in education and decreases in the
cost of concessions. More educated individuals have more to gain from concessions, so they are
willing to invest more.
Palestinians also value the quality of the relationships they have with people around them.
This includes Israelis, and this allows for an analysis of the willingness to reconcile. Reconcil-
iation requires eﬀort, but has beneﬁts in terms of improving the quality of relationships, and
possibly also has economic beneﬁts. Denote these beneﬁts by R(r;e), where r denotes eﬀorts
to reconcile. The beneﬁts depend on education because economic beneﬁts of reconciliation are
likely to vary with education. Assume that the marginal product of eﬀorts at reconciliation, R0,
is positive but decreasing (R0(·,e) > 0,R00(·,e) < 0 for all e).
Engaging in reconciliation also has a psychological cost, as it may be hard to reconcile
with people if past experience with them was bad. This cost increases in the level of frustra-
tion experienced due to the conﬂict. This psychological cost can be seen as hate generated
because Palestinians see Israel as responsible for their miseries, roots of hatred in self-defense
and vengeance. (Glaeser (2002) study the formation of hate). The experimental literature on
reciprocity (see Fehr and Schmidt (2005)) conﬁrms that subjects forgo rewards if that allows
them to punish people who have behaved unfairly, particularly by rejecting unequal oﬀers in
ultimatum games. Concretely, as stated above, this hate and frustration may be linked to the
poor labor market conditions and therefore may vary with individuals’ level of education. Model
this by assuming that the cost of reconciliation eﬀort c(e) increases in frustration due to the
conﬂict, and that frustration is driven by the diﬀerence between potential and actual wages.
2If this was about actions, not attitudes, this would of course be a strategic game, where Israeli actions also
matter for payoﬀs.
10Then c(e) = f(w(e) − ¯ w),f0 > 0 and c0(e) > 0. Individuals then set their optimal amount of
reconciliation to maximize its beneﬁts net of the psychological cost. This yields the optimal-
ity condition R0(r;e) = c(e). Individuals engage in reconciliation up to the point where the
marginal beneﬁt equals the marginal cost. More educated individuals prefer a higher level of
reconciliation if the beneﬁts from it increase strongly enough with education. If beneﬁts do
not rise strongly with education, in contrast, more educated individuals prefer a lower level of
reconciliation, as reconciliation is costly for them because of the frustration they have endured
due to the depressed labor market conditions.
The link between attitudes towards reconciliation and the general economic losses such as the
impact of the conﬂict on employment opportunities and returns to schooling has been suggested
previously. Morrow 2000 argues that forgiveness and reconciliation in the context of ethnop-
olitical conﬂict could be considered an issue for society as a whole because personal injuries
committed by the parties in conﬂict are often understood as the grief not only of individuals
but of whole communities.
4 Measuring individuals’ attitudes
4.1 The Item Response Model
In this section, I deﬁne a model for estimating the latent attitudes towards a peace process.
The model used in this paper is a hierarchical item response model3 estimated following the
approach proposed by Spady (2007). The model is represented graphically in Figure 3.
From the considerations in the previous section, every individual has attitudes towards con-
cessions and towards reconciliation that depend on the potential payoﬀs and costs they face.
That is, the optimal s implies an attitude towards concessions AC and the optimal r an attitude
towards reconciliation AR. Together, these attitudes constitute the individual’s predisposition
towards a peace process. They also cause responses to survey questions on the issue. Finally,
they also underlie agents’ behavior; e.g. their political decisions or their propensity to engage in
violence. The analysis of the impact of the attitudes on actions is left for future research.
From the model, education and other factors that systematically aﬀect costs and payoﬀs
3See Steele and Goldstein (2007) for an overview of this type of item response models.
11aﬀect the willingness to make concessions and the willingness to reconcile. Solving the optimality
conditions for the optimal choices then leads to the empirical speciﬁcation
AC = hC(e,X,C) (1)
AR = hR(e,X,R) (2)
where X is a vector of covariates that captures diﬀerences in individuals’ costs or preferences.
The empirical speciﬁcation thus reﬂects the idea that individual characteristics and experiences
as well as community characteristics can be related to individuals’ attitudes towards reconcil-
iation and towards concessions. It is also assumed that these characteristics do not aﬀect the
answers directly, but only through their eﬀect on the attitudes.
Equations (1) and (2) constitute a structural model with the following underlying assump-
tions: (1) the expressions of agreement and disagreement on questions about conﬂict resolution
(‘item responses’) reﬂect corresponding attitudes of the responder; (2) the ‘attitudes’ are endur-
ing individual-speciﬁc attributes, given the individual’s characteristics and environment; and (3)
each one of the series of item responses used is determined by a single attitude only (attitudes
towards reconciliation and attitudes towards concessions respectively).
The variables used to estimate the individual attitudes and those included in X are discussed
in Section 5. Before that, I describe how to obtain the likelihood function used to measure
the attitudes towards reconciliation and to obtain the correlates with the individual personal
characteristics. The likelihood function and the estimation method used for the analysis of the
attitudes towards concessions is the same. It only diﬀers in the use of diﬀerent questions. I
denote the items used to construct the reconciliation scale as R and the items used to construct
the concessions scale as C.
4.2 Structural Representation




12where A is univariate, Um ∼ U(0,1) and gm(·) is weakly increasing in U and strictly increasing
in A. It is also assumed that Ui ⊥ Uj ∀ i 6= j and Ui ⊥ A ∀ i which implies that conditional on
A the responses are independent (Ri ⊥ Rj|A).4
Personal characteristics may aﬀect the way this latent variable is distributed in the popu-
lation. We assume that individual characteristics, and particularly education, may aﬀect the
latent variable A, but do not aﬀect the measurements Rm directly. (They can of course aﬀect
them via A.) Consider the linear case
A = h(X,) = Xβ + ε (3)
where ε ∼ N(0,1) and ε ⊥ X. Assume also that Um ⊥ ε and Um ⊥ X.




    
    
1 if Q0(a) < um ≤ Q1(a)
2 if Q1(a) < um ≤ Q2(a)
3 if Q2(a) < um ≤ Q3(a)
4 if Q3(a) < um ≤ Q4(a)
where Qr(a), r = {1,2,3,4}, are thresholds functions for item m, and 0 = Q0(a) < Q1(a) <
Q2(a) < Q3(a) < Q4(a) = 1. Figure 2 shows the graphical representation of the functions
Qr(a). This ﬁgure shows that higher item responses are associated to higher values of a, i.e.
if a2 > a1 then the item responses of a2 population stochastically dominate a1. Thus, higher
item responses are associated to higher values of a. This assumption implies that the lines that
indicate the probability of answering k or higher in item j given a have to be downward sloping.
Of course, they cannot cross if probabilities are to be non-negative.
The model is identiﬁed if the structure, together with the restrictions of the model, delivers
the distribution of observables:
S = {g(A,U),FU|A} ⇒ FR|A,
where FU|A denotes the cumulative distribution function of a random variable U conditional on
4These assumptions correspond to the standard assumption in item response theory (IRT); unidimensionality
(A is unidimensional), monotonicity (gm(A,Um) is strictly increasing in A) and local independence. See Steele
and Goldstein (2007) for a review of hierarchical parametric IRT.
13A. From the identiﬁcation result, the following equality follows:
FU|A(Qr(a)|A = a) = FR|A(r|A = a)
and because of the uniformity of the error term
Qr(a) = FR|A(r|A = a) = Pr(R ≤ r|A = a).
Qr(a) thus is a conditional cumulative distribution function.
The way of modeling Pr(R ≤ r|A = a) diﬀers among diﬀerent types of item response models.
In this paper these functions are modeled as in Spady (2007), using the distribution function







where the functions γ1(u) and γ2(u) are 2 basis functions, chosen to be (shifted) Legendre
polynomials and τ1 and τ2 are the parameters estimated. From Gr(a) we obtain Qr(a) as
Qr(a) = 1 − Gr(a).
To ensure that the lines do not cross, they are constructed as products of the estimated
distribution functions. Consider an item m with 4 possible answers, so r = {1,2,3,4}, Q4(a) =
1 and Q0(a) = 0 by deﬁnition. Assume Q3(a), G2(a) and G1(a) are distribution functions
estimated as described above. Then Q2(a) = [1 − G2(a)]Q3(a) and Q1(a) = [1 − G1(a)]Q2(a).5
To build the likelihood function, the conditional probability of a response r, Pr(R = r|A =
a), is obtained as
Pr(R = r|A = a) = Pr(R ≤ r|A = a) − Pr(R ≤ r − 1|A = a)
= Qr(a) − Qr−1(a)
To simplify notation, denote Pr(R = r|A = a) as p(r|a;τr).











5This also implies that the stochastic dominance is strengthened to dominance in hazard order.
14Because of the assumption of conditional independence of the responses, it is possible to express
the likelihood function as a product of the conditional item probabilities. β is a vector of
parameters that indicates the eﬀect of X on the mean of A. τ parameterizes the distribution




The integral in the likelihood function has no general closed form solution. The integration
is thus carried out using Gauss-Hermite quadrature at 200 grid points. Quadrature methods






Gaussian quadrature rules choose not only the weights, but also the evaluation points or ab-
cissæ, and can achieve higher precision with a ﬁx number of points. To ensure that we can take
into account even distributions with small variance, Gaussian quadrature has been applied to
5 diﬀerent segments of the grid, with the segment in the middle having a higher concentration
of points. A Newton-Raphson algorithm is used to maximize the log-likelihood function. Con-
cretely, we use the BFGS method which builds an approximation to the Hessian in the course
of iteration.6
4.3 Identiﬁcation
The model is deﬁned as the structure
S = {g(A,U),FU|A}
with
FU|A(Qr(a)|A = a) = FR|A(r|A = a)
and the restrictions described above: Um ∼ U(0,1), gm(·) is weakly increasing in U and strictly
increasing in A, Ui ⊥ A ∀i, Ui ⊥ Uj ∀i 6= j, f(a) is assumed to be known. The model identiﬁes
6For a general discussion about estimation procedures for multilevel generalized linear models see Rodriguez
(2008).
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F∗
U|A(Q∗




r(a)|A = a) = F0
R|A(r|A = a)
and F∗
R|A(r|A = a) 6= F0
R|A(r|A = a).
To ensure that the model uniquely identiﬁes F(R|A = a), it is necessary to impose parametric
restrictions. Hu and Schennach (2006) have a nonlinear measurement error model that is related
to the model presented here. These authors relate the joint densities of the observable variables
to the joint densities of the unobservable variables in the same way as equation 6 shows. This
equation admits an equivalent operator representation:
LR|X = LR|ALA|X
The proof of identiﬁcation relies on the assumption of the operator LR|A ≡
R
fR|A(R|A =
a)g(A)A . being ‘injective’. Intuitively, LR|A will be injective if there is enough variation in the
density of R for diﬀerent values of A (or X). In our case this assumption is not fulﬁlled because
of the discreteness of R combined with ﬁnite amount of data. Therefore, the proof that Hu and
Schennach (2006) propose is not be applicable in our case.
Douglas (2001) shows that nonparametric item response models are only identiﬁable in an
asymptotic sense, i.e., when the number of items tends to inﬁnity, in which case the problem
would be the one analyzed by Hu and Schennach (2006). For parametric models identiﬁcation




generated by the diﬀerent combinations of responses limits the values of the parameters to a
unique set. If Qr(a) were modeled nonparametrically, the degrees of freedom would be much
greater than the number of constraints, considering that the value of the function at each
point may be viewed as a separate parameter and the constraints derived from the manifest
distributions are not suﬃcient to identify Qr(a). The set up of this paper is parametric; Qr(a;τ)
is modeled as a function of some parameters.
16There are 46−1 = 4094 possible constraints in the model of attitudes towards reconciliation
and 37 − 1 = 2186 in the model of attitudes towards concessions. Since there are many con-
straints/points of support, the estimation of Qr(a;τ), although parametric, is very ﬂexible. The
set up of this paper approximates these distributions using two parameters, therefore the degrees
of freedom are larger than the parameters to be estimated, the model identiﬁes the functions
gm(·).
Also close to our model is the measurement error model analyzed in Hu (2008), where the
variable with measurement error and the misclassiﬁed measurements are assumed to be discrete.
In that case, the author shows that the latent model can be expressed as an explicit function of
directly observed distribution functions and that therefore, under this framework fR|A and fA|X
are nonparametric identiﬁed.
In this paper we have considered that since the points of support are large enough, this allows
us to model the latent variables as continuous and still obtain a suﬃcient ﬂexible approximation
of Qr(a;τ).
5 Data
The data comes from the public opinion surveys designed and conducted by the Palestinian
Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR). This institution conducted public opinion
polls from 2000 to 2008, collecting information about attitudes and values of a representative
sample of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including East Jerusalem. The
surveys used in this paper are the ones that include exactly the same questions about attitudes
towards reconciliation: December 2001 (poll #3), May 2002 (poll #4), April 2003 (poll #7),
March 2005 (poll #15) and December 2006 (poll #22). These surveys also include information
about personal and demographic characteristics. To measure attitudes towards concession I use
data for December 2003 (poll #10), December 2005 (poll #18), and December 2006 (poll #22).
The only survey that contains information on both concessions and reconciliation is the one for
December 2006.
This data set is particularly useful because questions are very precise and allow distinguishing
between attitudes towards reconciliation and towards concessions. The items reﬂecting attitudes
17towards reconciliation emphasize that the questions refer to steps that the Palestinians could take
once the state of Palestine was established. The items reﬂecting attitudes towards concessions
refer to key issues such as ﬁnal borders, the status of Jerusalem, refugees, and the security
arrangements that have been recurrently brought up during peace negotiations (the Geneva
Initiative, the Clinton Parameters and the Taba Negotiations). This distinction is important
because the use of more general questions can lead to misleading conclusions. For instance,
measuring attitudes towards peace using the support for the continuation of peace negotiations as
in Abu Sada (1998) is problematic because individuals’ answers are also aﬀected by other factors
like their conﬁdence in the leaders involved in the negotiations. The use of party identiﬁcation
as a way to infer attitudes, as used for example in Jaeger et al. (2008), can also lead to wrong
conclusions since other issues like a person’s degree of religiosity or the current ruling party’s
level of corruption can play a role. Hence, the precise wording of the questions in the survey used
here makes more precise measurement possible and makes the data set particularly useful. The
full wording of the questions/items used to estimate the individuals’ latent attitudes is shown
in the appendix.
Summary statistics of the responses to these items are presented in Table 1. Items on
reconciliation have four possible answers (scale from 1 to 4) and items on concessions have three
possible answers (scale from 1 to 3). A higher score corresponds to a more positive attitude
towards reconciliation or concessions. Even among the items referring to one attitude, answering
behavior varies over these items. Considering for instance the question ”Would you support to
adopt a school curriculum in the Palestinian state that recognizes Israel and teaches school
children not to demand the return of all Palestine to the Palestinians?” and the question ”In
case of a two state solution, would you support to open borders to free movement of people
and goods?”, the mean answer diﬀers strongly, at 1.71 for the ﬁrst question and 3.04 for the
second. This indicates that diﬀerent items carry information on respondents’ attitudes to a
varying degree, or capture diﬀerent aspects. Thus, by focussing on just one questions, or on
a narrow subset of questions, valuable information may be lost. This is also indicated by the
pairwise correlation coeﬃcients for the items shown in Table 2; correlations are positive but far
from perfect.
18The theoretical model suggests that some demographic variables are informative about the
individual attitudes. Therefore, they are also used in the estimation. A descriptive analysis of
these variables is shown in Table 3. This table shows an increase in the percentage of individuals
with high levels of education and with a high degree of religiosity. The theoretical justiﬁcation
for the inclusion of personal and demographics characteristics in the estimation is the following:
Education. As seen above, the role of education in shaping attitudes towards a peace process
is not well understood in the existing literature. The goal of this paper is to shed some light
on the connection of education with Palestinians’ attitudes. To measure education I use three
dummy variables: Low education (elementary education or less), medium education (preparatory
or secondary education) and and high education (college or more).
Religion: personal piety. Tessler and Nachtway (1998) state that “the theoretical linkage
between religion and international politics is based on the assumption that religion plays a
crucial role in shaping both the normative orientation of individuals and their understanding of
the surrounding world.” They ﬁnd that diﬀerent dimensions of religiosity have diﬀerent eﬀects on
individuals’ attitudes towards politics or towards international conﬂicts. They ﬁnd that support
for political Islam and religious activism have a strong eﬀect on an individual’s political views,
while personal piety is unrelated to those views. Unfortunately, I am not able to distinguish
between these two dimensions of religiosity. The surveys only contain information on the degree
of personal piety. The measure of personal piety used are three dummy variables based on the
answer to the following question: “How often do you pray? 1) every day, 2) only on Friday or
occasionally, 3) rarely or never.”
Economic determinants: household income/family size. The relation between individ-
uals’ current economic situation and their attitudes is a priori ambiguous. It could be that
individuals who are currently doing well believe that this will allow them to beneﬁt more from
economic opportunities arising with peace. It may, however, also motivate them to avoid change,
and pit them against an agreement, whereas the poor might support it in the hope of an im-
provement in their situation, and because they have little to lose. On the other hand, they may
19be frustrated due to their economic situation, and not believe in the beneﬁts of an agreement.
In this sense, Nachtwey and Tessler (2002) ﬁnd that currently unsatisﬁed individuals tend to
be against an agreement. In addition, there is some new evidence ﬁnding little relationship
between hate crimes in general and economic conditions.7 It is possible that this relationship
(or its absence) also holds for attitudes towards reconciliation.
We measure household income using three dummies: Low Income (monthly income per
person in the household ≤ 125$), medium income (income per person between 125 and 450$)
and high income (income per person > 450$).
Age. Since attitudes might change over the life cycle due to personal experience but also due
to national and global developments, the age of respondents can be informative.8
Working for the Public Sector. The public sector continues to be an important source of
employment in Palestine. In 2003, public sector employment (by the Palestinian Authorithy
and by municipalities) accounted for an estimated 26 percent of total employment in the West
Bank and Gaza. For many young men coming from poor families this is the only route of social
mobility. Therefore, working for the public sector is also an indication of how well the individual
is doing. In addition, working in the public sector may of course by itself inﬂuence attitudes.
Being unmarried. Being unmarried in Palestine can be a source of frustration. Marriage
is important because in Palestine, it represents the key to adulthood. It also is a religious
obligation. Marriage is expensive; some families have to save all their lives to aﬀord the wedding
of their children.9 Since the economic situation has been deteriorating in the last years, it is
possible that individuals who cannot aﬀord marriage seek outlets for their frustration, translating
into more negative attitudes towards reconciliation.
We also control for gender and region of residence as they can inﬂuence the experiences faced
during life.
7See Krueger and Maleckova (2003). Green, McFalls and Smith (2001) provide a survey of the literature on
hate crimes.
8Note that the variable used is age standardized by its mean, and standardized age squared over 100.
9For an illustration, see ‘The wedding shortage’, Navtej Dhillon, Newsweek.com, March 2007. This article
explains why the Middle East has the lowest rates of marriage in the developing world.
206 Results
In this section I use the methodology explained above to infer the relationship between demo-
graphics and attitudes towards concessions and towards reconciliation. I then use the construc-
tion of the separation barrier to explore the channel through which the conﬂict aﬀects attitudes
towards reconciliation diﬀerently across education groups.
6.1 Attitudes towards concessions
Table 4 shows the eﬀect of the personal characteristics on the mean of the probability distri-
bution of attitudes towards concessions for a given person. They correspond to the coeﬃcient
vector β in equation (3). The eﬀects are additive, which means that statements such as ‘more
educated people have more positive attitudes towards concessions’ must be understood in a ‘ce-
teris paribus’ sense (Spady 2006). Coeﬃcients describe deviations from a ‘standardized’ person.
This is a male who lives in Hebron, has the mean age of the sample, is married, has a medium
level of income per family member, is not a refugee, has low education and prays very often.
Results show that education is positively related to attitudes towards concessions. This
ﬁnding is in line with the argument advanced above that more educated people could have more
to gain from an agreement that eases the constraints on the Palestinian economy and therefore
have more to gain from concessions.
Family income also matters; families with lower income tend to support the concessions
discussed in the peace talks. Again, controlling for education, these might be the ones who
have most to gain (or least to lose) from an agreement. The degree of religiosity reduces the
willingness to make concessions.
Other authors have found that education has a negative impact on attitudes towards con-
tinuing with the peace negotiations after the Oslo agreements (Abu Sada 1998) or towards the
Road Map (Jasso and Meyersson 2004). These authors explain this result by the fact that bet-
ter educated respondents have more access to information and are therefore more aware of the
problems of the possible agreements. Because of the diﬀerent questions used to measure the at-
titudes, it is diﬃcult to compare their results with the ones in this paper. The questions used in
those papers are related to a particular moment in time and to a particular negotiation process.
21It seems likely that the individuals’ answers take into account other factors like the strength of
the Palestinian leaders or the international and Israeli political situation. The questions used
in this paper to measure attitudes towards concessions are more atemporal in the sense that
they are related to the key elements that have recurrently been subject of negotiation in peace
talks. Therefore they provide more reliable information on individuals’ general attitudes towards
concessions.
6.2 Education and attitudes towards reconciliation
The previous section described results about willingness to make concessions obtained using
a collection of items Cm. In this section I measure ‘attitudes towards reconciliation’ using a
diﬀerent collection of items Rm.
Results are presented in Table 5. It is clear that they diﬀer substantially from those for con-
cessions. In particular, education is negatively correlated with attitudes towards reconciliation.
This negative eﬀect has strengthened over the years in the sample (2001-2006). Figure 5 shows
the evolution of the eﬀect of education over time. The coeﬃcient on the high education dummy
is signiﬁcantly negative in all years except for 2001, and becomes stronger (more negative) over
time. The coeﬃcient on the medium education dummy is less negative, but evolves very much
in parallel with the high education coeﬃcient. (The omitted group is low education.)
These results lend support to the idea that the depressed market opportunities of highly
educated workers and the frustration generated by the diﬀerence between expected and actual
wages matter for attitudes towards reconciliation (assuming that Palestinians attribute this lack
of opportunities to the conﬂict and the interdependence with Israel). This hypothesis also ﬁts
with the strengthening of the education coeﬃcient that accompanies the deterioration of the
political and economic situation over the sample.
Reconciliation, economic expectations, and political events: It is instructive to con-
sider the evolution of attitudes over time in more detail. Figure 5 plots the coeﬃcients associated
to the high and medium education variables obtained from the diﬀerent samples together with
the evolution of GDP per capita. From visual inspection, it is clear that attitudes of the highly
educated individuals and GDP per capita move together closely over time.
22In particular, the fall in GDP per capita from the beginning of the second Intifada in 2000
until 2002 is accompanied by a steep drop in the attitudes towards reconciliation of the highly
educated. Afterwards, as GDP per capita recovers following the Road Map conference, attitudes
also improve again brieﬂy, only to deteriorate again from 2003 onwards. They reach a low point
in 2006, the year Hamas wins the Parliamentary elections. The international response to that
victory again caused an important drop in GDP per capita. Overall, since the start of the
Second Intifada in 2000, per capita GDP in Palestine has fallen by about a third, from $1621
in 1999 to $1129 by the end of 2006. Attitudes of the highly educated have evolved in a similar
way. More formally, the correlation between the coeﬃcients on the education variables for the
diﬀerent years and GDP per capita or economic growth is positive and in almost all the cases
statistically signiﬁcant (see Table 6).
Because the evolution of GDP is closely linked to political events (the Intifada, peace talks),
it is not clear whether the close link between GDP and attitudes of the educated is due to
the evolution of GDP or whether politics is a common driving force. There is also the third
possibility of attitudes driving some political events. All this indicates that there is a strong
interdependence between politics and economics in the West Bank and Gaza, and that there is
an interdependence between the socio-economic situation and attitudes towards reconciliation.
Although economic factors are often mentioned and may matter at the aggregate level, we
ﬁnd that family income does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on attitudes towards reconciliation. So
relative income (conditional on education) is not signiﬁcantly related to these attitudes. This
suggests that it is overall and not individual economic deprivation that is closely related to
attitudes.
These results are similar to results obtained in the literature on education and violence. For
instance, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Berrebi (2007) both ﬁnd that “having a living
standard above the poverty line or a secondary school or higher education is positively associ-
ated with participation in violent groups.” Although our explanation relates low willingness to
reconcile to the lack of opportunities in the labor market, the results are also consistent with
the hypothesis stated by these authors that more highly educated individuals have a more acute
awareness of the political situation, resulting in deeper moral concerns and a more negative at-
23titude towards reconciliation. This hypothesis ﬁts well with the strengthening of the education
coeﬃcient that accompanies the deteriorating political and economic situation.
Finally, both Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Berrebi (2007) point out the possibility
that the positive relationship between education and violence could be related to the content of
the education. For instance, Stern (2000) explains how religious schools in Pakistan can induce
students to get involved in violence and terrorism. In the case of Palestine it is unlikely that the
education system itself negatively aﬀects attitudes to reconciliation. In 2006 around 67 percent
of students were enrolled in Palestinian Authority public schools, 27.2 percent in schools run
by the United Nations (UNRWA), and 6.2 percent in private or NGO-run schools, including
those linked to Hamas and other groups.10 Figure 4 shows the evolution of the distribution of
schools of each type during 2001 to 2007. The share of private schools is small and stable over
the period. So even if religious schools gained importance among private schools, this can only
be a minor phenomenon. Although it is true that the curriculum of Palestinian public schools
has been criticized for containing anti-Semitic stereotypes, this refers to primary and secondary
schools only.11 Therefore, if the content of education was radicalizing students, it should have
an eﬀect on the whole sample. It is implausible that it mainly aﬀects the most highly educated
individuals.
Another factor that is strongly related to attitudes towards reconciliation is the degree of
religiosity (measured as the frequency with which the individual prays). The results indicate that
in 2001, the attitudinal diﬀerences between individuals with diﬀerent degree of religiosity were
weak. With time, diﬀerences become more clear. More religious people tend be less favorable
to reconciliation. Causality is not clear, since we do not know if people with more negative
attitudes towards reconciliation become more religious or if more religious individuals changed
their attitudes toward reconciliation.
Being female, being a refugee, working for the public sector, or being unmarried do not have
signiﬁcant eﬀects. The inﬂuence of age is not clear.
Overall, educated or religious individuals are less in favor of reconciliation with Israel, with
10Source: ‘Factbox – Facts about Palestinian schools,’ Reuters Foundation, September 2006.
11This has led to the introduction of new textbooks in 2000, but the sample of individuals under analysis has
not been aﬀected by this. For more information on the old and new textbooks see Brown (2001).
24the eﬀects of education and religion strengthening over time. In the next section, we have a
closer look at the eﬀect of education.
6.3 The eﬀect of the separation barrier on attitudes towards reconciliation
In the previous sections I have linked the negative eﬀect of education to the frustration derived
from the general economic losses such as the impact of the conﬂict on employment opportunities
and returns to schooling. In this section I will give more evidence in line with the idea that are
events at the national, not local level matter for attitudes. For this, I exploit the construction
of the separation wall and regional fatalities.
In June 2002 the Israeli authorities began building a barrier (wall) along the border of the
West Bank with Israel. The Israeli government has declared that the objective of the wall is to
protect Israeli citizens from the attacks of suicide bombers. The trajectory of the wall is depicted
in Figure 6. The ﬁrst parts were built in the northern West Bank districts of Jenin, Tulkarem
and Qalqilia. At the end of July 2003 Israel also started building a wall in the northern and
eastern parts of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. After that, the wall continued south to Hebron. To
build the wall, Palestinian land has been expropriated. In addition, the wall at times extends far
into the West Bank, leaving parts of it inaccessible or disrupting circulation between villages.
The eﬀects of the separation barrier on the Palestinians is twofold. Firstly, it aﬀects Pales-
tinians who live nearby, particularly their ability to travel freely within the West Bank and to
access work in Israel, or to access other services (health, education or religious sites). Its pres-
ence also reduces arable land. Therefore the separation barrier directly aﬀects the population
of the localities through which the wall passes, resulting in localized economic losses. Secondly,
many Palestinians see the separation barrier as an attempt to artiﬁcially create a border, cre-
ating ‘facts on the ground.’ Therefore, the wall can also aﬀect Palestinians generally, not only
locally, causing moral and existential concerns.
The construction of the wall helps to explore the channel through which education aﬀects
attitudes towards reconciliation. Controlling for the disruption caused by the construction of the
wall in an individual’s region of residence allows to capture the local eﬀect of the wall. This can
be done separately by group of education, giving an indication of how the experience of personal
losses shapes attitudes for diﬀerent groups of education. Any additional eﬀect of education on
25attitudes should then be due to other, more general concerns.
This analysis is possible because the data indicate in which region individuals live. In
addition, I use measures of the evolution of the length of the wall, the areas of land left on the
Israeli side of the wall (in most of the cases, this land has been conﬁscated) and the areas that
have become enclaves.12
I have this information for July 2003, February 2005, and July 2006. The ﬁrst two dates
correspond quite closely to the moments in time when the surveys have been conducted (maxi-
mum diﬀerence of three months). For 2006, the diﬀerence is larger. To deal with this, I assume
that the parts of the wall that were under construction in July 2006 were completed by the time









where WER refers to the eﬀect of the wall in region R, WallR is the length of the wall expressed
in km, and BorderR refers to the length of the Green Line border for region R expressed in
km. The OutsideLandR is the area of the region that remains between the Green Line and the
wall and the EnclavesR are the areas that have become enclaves due to the route of the wall.
These areas are divided by the total area of the region and they are all expressed in km2. Figure
6 and tables 7, 8 and 9 show the evolution of the construction of the wall and the measures
used to construct the index. While it is not obvious if the functional form chosen is optimal
for ﬁtting disruptions suﬀered by individuals living in adjacent regions, it receives some support
from evidence suggesting that other possible measures of the eﬀect of the wall are correlated with
the index constructed here. Using data for 2005, ﬁgure 7 shows the relation of WER for 2005
with the number of buildings destroyed and with the amount of land that has been expropriated.
The correlation between WER and the two alternative measures is 0.61 and 0.57 respectively.13
With this measure I can then test whether living close to the wall and being exposed to its
eﬀects aﬀects attitudes. Because the eﬀect of the wall diﬀers across regions and over time, it can
be distinguished from just a year eﬀect and from regional eﬀects. In addition, because deviations
12Sources: These measures have been computed with information from the U.N. Oﬃce for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Aﬀairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the Palestinian Environmental NGO’s network.
13Note that it was not possible to directly use these alternative measure in our analysis since they are available
only for 2005. Moreover, they are not available for the region of Toubas.
26of the wall from the Green Line are mainly guided by the placement of Israeli settlements and
by the location of natural resources, the index is exogenous.14
Results are reported in table 10. The ﬁrst column shows results for the whole sample. It
conﬁrms the eﬀects found above; more educated or more religious people are less in favor of
reconciliation. In addition, we ﬁnd that living in areas strongly aﬀected by the wall does not
make people less favorable to reconciliation. Although negative, the coeﬃcient is statistically
signiﬁcant only at a 15% level. Splitting the sample by education (low and medium levels of
education vs high levels of education) produces interesting results. While other signs and levels
of signiﬁcance are largely unchanged, eﬀects of living close to the wall are smaller and less
signiﬁcant for people with high levels of education.
The result that personal losses due to the wall have a weaker eﬀect on attitudes of people
with higher education may arise for several reasons. One possibility is that the wall must be
aﬀecting certain occupations more than others. Low educated individuals are more likely to be
farmers, a group particularly strongly aﬀected by the wall, both because of the loss of arable
land and because of the disruption of transport routes.15
Overall, education is negatively related to attitudes towards reconciliation, in contrast to
the eﬀect found for personal losses. The presence of the wall thus cannot be the driving force
behind the negative eﬀect of education. More educated people seem to react to something else.
The evolution of the education coeﬃcient over time suggests that a more acute perception of
the political and socioeconomic situation could be driving their attitudes towards reconciliation
with Israel.
14The Government of Israel maintains that the following considerations are taken into account when determining
the route of the wall: continuity in order to be operational, creation of controlled areas, minimum damage to
the landscape, avoidance of the inclusion of Palestinian villages in the areas of the security fence, and minimal
disruption in the daily life of the population residing near the wall. See the Israeli Ministry of Defense’s website:
www.seamzone.mod.gov.il. Concerning the settlements, Ariel Sharon’s cabinet agreed to extend the wall to
encircle Jewish settlements deep in the West Bank (see ‘Israeli cabinet extends ’security fence”, The Guardian,
October 2 2003). The International Court of Justice Report of 8 September 2003 (E/CN.4/2004/6) also points
out that the Wall incorporates illegal Israeli settlements that form the subject of negotiations between Israel and
Palestine.
15See B’Tselem report on the eﬀects of the wall. B’Tselem is the information center for human rights in the
occupied territories.
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Given the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict, hints about why it is so hard to resolve
are very valuable. In this paper, I have used Palestinian survey data to explore the determinants
of Palestinians’ attitudes towards the peace process, understood as attitudes towards possible
concessions they might be willing to make to achieve a settlement, and attitudes towards recon-
ciliation in case of such a settlement. Because of the breadth of the object to be measured, the
use of more than one dimension is natural. This is conﬁrmed by the empirical analysis of the
joint distribution of attitudes. Concerning the determinants, we focus particularly on education
because of its ambiguous role in previous literature.
On economic grounds, more educated people could be expected to have more to gain from a
peace process, in particular in the context of the repressed Palestinian economy. The empirical
analysis indeed conﬁrms that controlling for current family income more educated people are
more willing to make concessions. This could be understood as an investment in peace, allowing
the dividends of peace to be reaped later on.
The eﬀect of education on attitudes towards reconciliation is disputed in previous work.
Some authors argue that less educated people are more prone to violence and hatred, while
others ﬁnd the opposite: more educated people are more likely to be involved in violent groups.
I ﬁnd results more consistent with the latter stream of the literature, and then probe a bit deeper
to identify a channel.
Individuals engage in reconciliation up to the point where the marginal beneﬁt equals the
marginal cost. The cost of reconciliation may be linked to the frustration endured due to the
depressed labor market conditions, and therefore may be larger for highly educated individuals,
explaining why highly educated individuals prefer lower levels of reconciliation.
At the macro level, it is clear that there is a strong interdependence between politics and
economics, and between the socio-economic situation and attitudes towards reconciliation. While
economic deprivation may not be associated with worse attitudes towards reconciliation at the
individual level, periods of economic stagnation or contraction coincide with worsening attitudes
at the national level. At the same time, the signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect of education on attitudes
towards reconciliation strengthens. I can identify that this is not due to direct, local eﬀects of the
28separation barrier. It hence seems plausible that events at the national level drive attitudes of
people with high education. Knowing that are not personal losses what strengthes the negative
attitudes towards reconciliation but rather the general situation, may be important for the peace
process. Education and economic aid may not be suﬃcient remedies.
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338 Appendix
Original wording of the questions/items we use to estimate the individual’s attitudes
towards reconciliation:
• After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian side and Israel and the estab-
lishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, the following are steps may be
taken in order to enhance relations between the State of Israel and a Palestinian State.
For each of the suggested steps please tell me whether you support or oppose it:
– Open borders to free movement of people and goods.
– Create joint economic institutions and ventures.
– Create joint political institutions (such as a parliament. designed eventually to lead
to a confederate system)
– Take legal measures against incitement against Israel.
– Adopt school curriculum in the Palestinian state that recognizes Israel and teaches
school children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians.
• After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian side and Israel and the establish-
ment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, would you, under these conditions
of peace, invite an Israeli colleague to visit you in your home?
Original wording of the questions/items we use to estimate the individual’s at-
titudes towards concessions:
The individuals are informed of the permanent compromise settlement, then they are ask
what do they think of each of the following items (Do they agree or disagree with them):
• Withdrawal to 1967 borders with territorial swap. (An Israeli withdrawal from all of the
Gaza Strip and the evacuation of its settlements. But in the West Bank, Israel withdraws
and evacuates settlements from most of it, with the exception of few settlement areas in
less than 3% of the West Bank that would be exchanged with an equal amount of territory
from Israel in accordance with the attached map show map. )
34• A state without an army but with international forces. (An independent Palestinian state
would be established in the areas from which Israel withdraws in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip; the Palestinian state will have no army, but it will have a strong security
force but an international multinational force would be deployed to insure the safety and
security of the state. Both sides will be committed to end all forms of violence directed
against each other.)
• East Jerusalem as capital of the state of Palestine after it is divided. (East Jerusalem
would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under
Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israel sovereignty. The
Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with
the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that will come under Israeli
sovereignty.)
• Refugees with ﬁve options for permanent residence. (With regard to the refugee question,
both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242 and on
the Arab peace initiative. The refugees will be given ﬁve choices for permanent residency.
These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state
in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee
return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third
countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of the states in those areas. The
number of refugees returning to Israel will be based on the average number of refugees
admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees will
be entitled to compensation for their ”refugeehood” and loss of properties.)
• End the conﬂict. (When the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will
mean the end of the conﬂict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties
will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples.)
• A sovereign state with security arrangements. (The Palestinian state will have sovereignty
over its land, water, and airspace. But Israeli will be allowed to use the Palestinian airspace
for training purposes, and will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15
35years. The multinational force will remain in the Palestinian state for an indeﬁnite period
of time and its responsibility will be to insure the implementation of the agreement, and
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Figure 1: Average Monthly Wage in NIS for wage employees in the Palestinian Territory .
Period: 2000-2006. Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.


































Figure 2: Probability Distributions of answering 1, 2, 3 or 4 in the item ’Invite an Israeli
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for survey questions on reconciliation and concessions
Reconciliation Concessions
Items Mean Std.Dev Items Mean Std.Dev
Borders 3.038 0.718 Borders 67 2.458 0.729
Eco Inst. 2.781 0.760 No Army 2.110 0.769
Pol Inst. 2.220 0.785 Jerusalem 2.241 0.790
No Incitement 2.282 0.776 Refugees 2.233 0.781
Curriculum 1.714 0.665 End Conﬂict 2.337 0.670
Invite Israeli 2.155 0.867 Security 2.072 0.867
Obs 6121 Obs 3509
Scale 1-4 Scale 1-3






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































42Table 6: Correlations between economic conditions and the willingness to reconcile of the edu-
cated individuals.
Med Educ High Educ Med Educ High Educ
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
per capita GDP 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
growth rate 1.370 1.560
(0.569) (0.895)
constant -2.625 -3.269 -0.303 -0.455
(0.795) (1.240) (0.050) (0.078)
R2 0.679 0.561 0.592 0.432
observations 6 6 6 6
Table 7: Summary of the wall and its eﬀects in 2003, by region.
Total Area Area Outside Area Enclaves Green Line Km Wall WE
Km2 Km2 Km2 Border Km Index
Jenin 587.838 33.891 0.000 50.02 61.421 1.286
Toubas 352.811 0.000 0.000 13.092 0.000 0.000
Tulkarm 243.586 23.135 0.000 29.867 37.321 1.345
Nablus 615.314 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Qalqilia 155.235 24.423 15.662 18.458 46.16 2.759
Salﬁt 211.175 0.000 0.000 5.598 4.003 0.715
Ramallah 849.188 0.000 0.000 46.283 0.000 0.000
Jericho 651.958 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Jerusalem 345.277 0.000 0.000 27.375 15.856 0.579
Bethlehem 637.548 0.000 0.000 22.245 10.475 0.471
Hebron 1007.135 0.000 0.000 91.817 0.000 0.000
Jabalia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gaza City 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Khan Younis 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Deir Baleh 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rafah 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
43Table 8: Summary of the wall and its eﬀects in 2005, by region.
Total Area Area Outside Area Enclaves Green Line Km Wall WE
Km2 Km2 Km2 Border Km Index
Jenin 587.838 36.104 0.000 50.02 65.19 1.365
Toubas 352.811 2.68 0.000 13.092 12.608 0.971
Tulkarm 243.586 23.135 0.000 29.867 37.321 1.345
Nablus 615.314 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Qalqilia 155.235 24.423 15.662 18.458 56.75 3.333
Salﬁt 211.175 0.000 0.000 5.598 18.134 3.239
Ramallah 849.188 7.761 0.000 46.283 26.31 0.578
Jericho 651.958 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Jerusalem 345.277 0.000 0.000 27.375 25.176 0.920
Bethlehem 637.548 0.000 0.000 22.245 10.475 0.471
Hebron 1007.135 2.325 0.000 91.817 14.658 0.162
Jabalia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gaza City 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Khan Younis 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Deir Baleh 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rafah 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 9: Summary of the wall and its eﬀects in 2006, by region.
Total Area Area Outside Area Enclaves Green Line Km Wall WE
Km2 Km2 Km2 Border Km Index
Jenin 587.838 36.104 0.000 50.02 65.19 1.365
Toubas 352.811 2.68 0.000 13.092 12.608 0.971
Tulkarm 243.586 23.135 0.000 29.867 37.321 1.345
Nablus 615.314 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Qalqilia 155.235 37.318 15.662 18.458 56.75 3.416
Salﬁt 211.175 13.567 0.000 5.598 25.86 4.684
Ramallah 849.188 84.521 1.512 46.283 59.158 1.379
Jericho 651.958 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Jerusalem 345.277 93.466 13.883 27.375 80.724 3.260
Bethlehem 637.548 8.815 0.000 22.245 10.475 0.485
Hebron 1007.135 12.71 0.000 91.817 64.757 0.718
Jabalia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gaza City 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Khan Younis 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Deir Baleh 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Figure 4: Distribution of the schools by supervising authority. Source: Palestinian Education
Ministry.
47Figure 5: Coeﬃcients associated to the education variables and evolution of GDP per capita.


































































Num Destroyed Buildings Wall Index 2005
Figure 7: Correlation between the index used and other possible measures of the eﬀect of the
wall. The number of buildings destroyed refer to the number of establishments in diﬀerent
sectors which were totally closed as a result of the wall, the conﬁscated land is the total area
conﬁscated by Israeli forces to construct the wall (usually taken by military order). Source:
PCBS – Survey on the Impact of the Expansion and Annexation Wall on the Socio-Economic
Conditions of Palestinian Localities which the Wall Passes Through, June 2005.
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